More idiocy by the TSA

[PeterNSteinmetz]

And this guy is making money off advising them. I bet the actual sensitivity of these tests, even combined, is just about zero.

https://www.foxnews.com/travel/ever...gers-red-flags-tsa-might-get-you-held-airport

 

[Bob Noel]

for those that can't get the fox link to work:

The airport behaviors that can get you pulled aside for TSA check

Jeff Price, an airport security coordinator-trainer, explained the behaviors, actions and physical traits that mean a traveler may have a higher chance of being pulled aside.

www.dailymail.co.uk

 

[rotorwrench]

I bet the actual sensitivity of these tests, even combined, is just about zero.

Can't speak much for his methods, but the core foundation for his approach has been used by the Israelis to great success for years. The Israeli version was originally one of the methods being looked at before TSA "solution" was passed.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Can't speak much for his methods, but the core foundation for his approach has been used by the Israelis to great success for years. The Israeli version was originally one of the methods being looked at before TSA "solution" was passed.

Do we know that the Israeli approach actually works?

The problem with testing here is similar to that with the TSA. One is attempting to prevent what are very rare events. So rare in fact in the case of the TSA that we are not able to conclude with any statistical confidence that they actually work for something like 50 years. That is if what one wants to do is prevent attacks which destroy commercial airliners leaving US airports by non-crew members.

I do not know the underlying numbers in the case of Israel so can't really comment on the data from that perspective. Certainly the Israelis are very thorough and they believe this works.

Of historical note is that the FAA also tried profiling before the introduction of the metal scanners. But no real data on the efficacy of that either because hijacking had been decreasing since 3 years prior to that starting in 1969.

 

[Jim Logajan]

There isn't any evidence that these highly subjective criteria narrow things down. Indeed, when made public they become easily subverted.
A simple back-test is to examine what was likely observed of the terrorists and hijackers during past incidents. Did the 9-11 hijackers yawn a lot, etc.?

 

[Ron Wanttaja]

Do we know that the Israeli approach actually works?

I believe the last El Al hijacking was in 1970.

There's a difference in what security measures you can implement with the aircraft of a single, state-owned airline with ~50 aircraft vs. an international terminal like JFK....

Ron Wanttaja

 

[rotorwrench]

Do we know that the Israeli approach actually works?

Yes. And on several different levels. Its considered the gold standard in the industry and has been written about a lot. But considering the populace of entire countries would happily go out of their way to blow up an Israeli aircraft the fact they haven’t done so for many decades is a pretty good track record.

The interesting part is after 9/11 when the Israelis offered to teach the US their security system, the end result would have been a system that operated with less than a tenth of the personnel the current TSA takes to operate. However, the main reason it wasn’t adopted was some of the actions are not permitted in the US by law. But final nail was congress couldn’t pass up having 50,000 more government employees.

There's a difference in what security measures you can implement with the aircraft of a single, state-owned airline with ~50 aircraft vs. an international terminal like JFK....

True. But the same process is used wherever EL AL flies to and from regardless of location. And through the ICAO agreement they can use that same system even if its not acceptable in the host country once the passenger is ticketed and at the airport.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Yes. And on several different levels. Its considered the gold standard in the industry and has been written about a lot. But considering the populace of entire countries would happily go out of their way to blow up an Israeli aircraft the fact they haven’t done so for many decades is a pretty good track record.

Maybe, but where is the data and analysis? It may work or it may be that something else is working. There are a lot of potential confounders here so I don't really think we can conclude that their airport security is what is doing the trick.

If people were really determined, I can think of a lot of other ways for people to blow up El Al aircraft, especially in other countries. Perhaps with a bit of imagination you can name a few?

The interesting part is after 9/11 when the Israelis offered to teach the US their security system, the end result would have been a system that operated with less than a tenth of the personnel the current TSA takes to operate. However, the main reason it wasn’t adopted was some of the actions are not permitted in the US by law. But final nail was congress couldn’t pass up having 50,000 more government employees.

The last is a very good point.

Overall, given the high variability in people's psychology, I am highly skeptical that any type of psychological profiling would have the effect of preventing hijackings, particularly of the non-destructive variety.

Indeed, if you look at the timeline of hijackings other than destroying planes by non-crew members in the US, there is a very strong drop in their rate in September 2001. It makes a fairly good case that spending the 8-10 Bn dollars per year on the TSA does decrease garden variety hijackings.

The problem of course is that says little or nothing about terrorist attacks and is probably not worth that much money to prevent the other hijacking types. Indeed, given the costs of the 9/11 attacks, we have probably now spent something like 10X that cost on trying to prevent them just in terms of dollars, leaving alone all the additional negative consequences of the TSA.

 

[rotorwrench]

Maybe, but where is the data and analysis?

The Israelis have it and don’t share it. Matter of fact everyone that was associated with the US training after 9/11 had to sign NDAs with the Israeli govt or something similar if they wanted to participate. Perhaps email EL AL and they'll share it? Or forward it to the Mossad for further action.

f people were really determined, I can think of a lot of other ways for people to blow up El Al aircraft, especially in other countries. Perhaps with a bit of imagination you can name a few?

Well considering EL AL flies to 100+ cities in North America, Europe, Middle East, and Asia, and hasn’t had an incident in 50+ years, I’d say that was pretty good. Since you know of a lot of other ways perhaps you should list them? I can’t think of any.

But just remember, the Israelis took out the Hezbollah head shed with exploding radios and pagers plus took out a Hamas leader in an Iranian military compound. Seems it would be pretty simple for them to keep people from blowing up or hijacking their airplanes.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

The Israelis have it and don’t share it. Matter of fact everyone that was associated with the US training after 9/11 had to sign NDAs with the Israeli govt or something similar if they wanted to participate. Perhaps email EL AL and they'll share it? Or forward it to the Mossad for further action.

Pretty typical excuse of government agencies that can’t actually demonstrate their efficacy. “It’s a national secret and we can’t tell you”. The TSA uses this all the time. Sorry, I don’t buy it and I don’t think anyone else should either.

Well considering EL AL flies to 100+ cities in North America, Europe, Middle East, and Asia, and hasn’t had an incident in 50+ years, I’d say that was pretty good. Since you know of a lot of other ways perhaps you should list them? I can’t think of any.

Oh this is easy. Just obtain some surface to air missiles or build them. Alternately attach some bombs at a field with lower security. Sabotage the planes in some other way at other fields. Many many ways.

Like I noted above, the fact that they haven’t had an attack in 50 years is not particularly good evidence that their airport security screening works.

But just remember, the Israelis took out the Hezbollah head shed with exploding radios and pagers plus took out a Hamas leader in an Iranian military compound. Seems it would be pretty simple for them to keep people from blowing up or hijacking their airplanes.

Again, think about it. Executing an attack on a defined target is a much smaller job than defending a very large attack surface. Yes, they are clever in some ways - and arguably violating international law - but they can’t be everywhere all the time.

In the case of the Israelis I suspect other methods are at work. They likely have better moles inside the organizations of their enemies and so can head things off in other ways.

What we are talking about here though is whether psychological profiling can work for air travel.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

There is actually a fair academic literature on this question. One can start with scholar.google.com and keywords “psychological profiling to prevent terrorist attacks”

There appears to be considerable skepticism that this can work. See for example https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/3986/380-947-1-PB.pdf . From that article -

“SPOT has met with increasing criticism for not being able to detect terrorists: There have been 23 occasions where terrorists have travelled through SPOT security points and no interceptions have been made using the technique [53]. As Meyer points out: ‘Put bluntly, the program has a 100% failure rate'”


To better understand this I would suggest starting by critically reading the overviews and reviews that are available. The rest cited here is basically anecdote.