Airline Pilots and Security

[Skid]

I recently saw a headline that uniforms are now being required to use the KCM checkpoint and how everyone is mad about it. I've always been kind of curious how security access works for pilots who are showing up for work vs those who are commuting vs those who are just traveling for fun.

Obviously if you're working that day in full uniform you just stroll through this KCM area and its no big deal. I'd imagine this is the same for commuters, but what if you're just traveling for fun to Vegas for the weekend, any restrictions? To the layman I can't see how TSA guys would know what your purpose is, but wasn't sure if the SOP at the airline forbid it or how it worked. Would this render getting something like TSA-precheck pointless? Can you basically bring anything through, are bags checked?

Similar to the above, do crew members have different access to the airport such as different parking areas to make it more convenient or back doors in a way to get to wear they need to be? Can a pilot just traveling for fun use these perks?

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Get rid of it. Seriously. It’s not accomplishing anything.

...

Let the security market figure it out. And toss the price on the ticket, not the entire country.

Exactly! The solution is to eliminate this $8.1 Bln per year theater and let the market figure out the proper trade offs.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Some old history that it is interesting to consider when thinking about the TSA and airline security.

1963 carriage of firearms on commercial flights by passengers banned

1969 Peak of the hijackings in the 60s and early 70s.

Jan 1973 Metal detector screening mandatory for all flights.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Exactly how would thar happen?? Different security gates as folks board? Can yo imagine the mess?

We debated this at length a year or so ago with many ideas brought up and discussed. I believe the conclusion was there may be some possible improvements which could be worth a try.

Was this truly forgotten? Or a fixed immutable belief?

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

I’ll bite. I do believe the TSA makes the skies safer and I’m certain that without it, we’d see more air piracy events and onboard incidents. With the way society is today, we couldn’t afford to go without extensive passenger security.

Ok, so why are you certain? What data do you think shows that the TSA makes us safer?

Important to note this subject has been studied in detail. See for example the book “Terror, Security, and Money”. It’s primary conclusion is that if we truly care about people’s safety, there are 100X more effective ways to spend our dollars.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

There’s a lot more behind the scenes security screening on the cargo side than you think.

Is that referring to airline cargo? I know the same has often been said to try and justify TSA screening of passengers. As far as we know, the TSA has never been able to document a single instance of a successful interception of a terrorist attack which was not also prevented by other mechanisms. Not even to congress in closed sessions with security clearances.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Take passenger security screening away and revert back to pre-911 airport environments and lets see what happens.

Interesting question to evaluate. I have actually computed whether the rate of incidents of commercial flights leaving US airports and then being deliberated destroyed by non-crew members as an attack was higher or lower before or after the inception of the TSA in November 2001.

It turns out there is NO statistically significant difference. These are very rare events so it would be quite a few years before one could conclude with any statistical validity that the TSA reduced the rate of such attacks.

So while this is a sort of common justification one hears from TSA employees for why the TSA is needed (I suspect they must have that in some of their training materials), it is an invalid argument. A form of the post-hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy.

And even if the TSA procedures reduce the rate of such attacks, it turns out the unintended consequences of such procedures (which likely increase traffic deaths ~500 per year) and their cost, imply the TSA is not an effective way to spend our tax dollars if what we really want to do is improve the safety of the traveling public. See the previously referenced book, "Terror, Security, and Money" which computes this is detail -- some might say excruciating detail.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

I applaud your willingness to study the accident / incident statistics, however, with the way society is these days, I simply can’t imagine airports without having some type of passenger security screening. While it may appear that the current system is meaningless to some, it serves as a deterrent. The same principle as having police sitting outside of a convenience store - it deters crime.

Thanks. I agree in the sense that no doubt having the TSA deters some types of incidents. This is also noted by the authors in "Terror, Security, and Money" as the observation that even putting one unarmed security guard in a mall in Minot ND improves safety marginally.

The big question though -- are the costs worth it? That is what has to be decided to determine if it is good public policy. I think the authors make a good case that if what we want to do is improve the safety of the traveling public that the funds spent on the TSA could be spent perhaps 100X more effectively per life potentially saved. If that is true, 100X, then I think it really is actually wrong to spend taxpayer dollars in that way, leaving aside all other objections.

I don't believe they even consider the potential costs in other lives lost on the highways. There is a fairly good case to be made that the TSA screening process decreases the use of short haul flights with people driving instead. Since driving is a lot more dangerous than flying commercially, Blalock et al (2009, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840601069757?journalCode=raec20) estimate that TSA screening is responsible for an excess of 327 driving deaths per year. If that is true, not only does the TSA ineffectively spend $8.1 Bln per year but the indirect consequences kill people.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Airline security should be put back to the airlines. Let the airlines maintain it. The airlines could even use it in advertising. And they could make it a much more pleasant experience.

That is how it used to be back before 1963, when the government made it illegal to carry firearms on the plane and in 1973 mandated metal detectors. For reference, the peak of hijackings in 60s and 70 was in 1969, 3 years before that mandate.

The case for privatizing airline security is laid out in more detail at http://realairlinesecurity.org.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

I got nabbed by TSA for a mini multi-tool in my backpack. I had lost it two years ago. I can't count how many times I've flown in the last two years. But this time they found it. I told the TSA guy that I thought small blades were okay now. He said that the FAA, TSA were going to change the rule to allow them but the pilots union fought it so that's why you can't bring a small pocket knife onboard now. I have no idea if this is true because it came from a TSA person and I've been misinformed by those people many times.

I believe it was the flight attendants union that opposed it. Never really understood their reasoning. https://www.afacwa.org/noknives

Good story anecdotally demonstrating the TSAs ineffectiveness. Indeed, they only detect 4% of tests smuggling contraband onto planes.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Y’all are welcome to have your opinions, but I feel immensely safer knowing that every Tom, Dick and Harry has been screened before boarding my aircraft.

I have no objection to other people deciding what kind of airlines and screening they want to undergo to board a flight. Entirely up to them so long as I am not forced to go along with their feelings. The TSA forces me to go along with their determination of what is the appropriate tradeoff between security and convenience, rather than what I and the airline think.

But if we are talking about public policy and spending tax dollars, then I think we have an obligation to ensure that the government is doing what is most rational in terms of trying to ensure safety and spending public dollars. I think the evidence is pretty good the TSA falls down on those points.

If airline security and the risks are returned to the airlines, I would be perfectly content. I imagine they will do a fairly good job of figuring out the appropriate tradeoff between security and convenience for the majority of their customers. I don't imagine that will include preventing people from carrying on their hair gel bottles or some coffee and having to take off their belts. I suspect it would evolve to a sort of combination of TSA-pre and frequent flyers.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

I remember the conversation, but not the specifics.

I do believe the TSA makes the skies safer. Not because of how many prohibited items the find or don’t find, but rather I believe it to act as a deterrent.
Do you really believe that if we did not have a TSA we would go this many years without a major issue?

Fair enough and thanks for answering. Yes, I think the evidence is fairly clear that there is no statistical evidence the TSA has improved the safety of flight. I think there needs to be a tradeoff between security and convenience which is best determined by the airlines, having been made fully responsible for the consequences (which they are not presently). They would likely have some security protocols in place, deciding on that with their insurance companies, to try and ensure safety to the best reasonable way.

But perfect safety in any undertaking is never achievable, it is always a tradeoff.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Shucks... 9/11 was before the TSA.

Not sure exactly the argument here. But the argument that the fact there have been no major attacks since the inception of the TSA implies the TSA works is not supported by the numbers. I have looked at this quite carefully. As above, the rate of attacks by non-crew members on airplanes before and after the inception of the TSA is NOT statistically significantly different. That argument is a form of the post-hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Another question for @Kritchlow on this. What evidence would persuade you that the TSA does not improve the safety of the traveling public? Something that could in principle exist or be produced?

This is often a good way to look at this sort of discussion. Because if none can be named, then essentially the belief is non-falsifiable, there is no way to disprove it. Then it is just a belief not really debatable, like many people's belief in religion.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

9-11 was truly "unthinkable" before it happened; now it's not only "thinkable" but indeed "do-able" in the minds of many. It's a different world.

I think I understand the concern, and the prospects of another such attack are truly frightening.

I agree that the comparison of attack rates before and after 2001 needs to be carefully considered. The rate of such events is very low so the power to detect a change is low. I point this out mostly to caution that we can't just follow the TSA line of "well, there have been no attacks since 2001 so what we are doing is useful". That fact alone is not good evidence that current TSA policy works. For that argument to be valid, one would have to demonstrate that there has been an increase in such attempted attacks or that the TSA has thwarted a fair number of same.

But the numbers show the TSA's ability to catch contraband in checkpoints is pathetic (4%) and they have been unable to demonstrate they have thwarted attacks which would otherwise not have been caught, even in classified hearings with the Senate. Very little evidence to suggest that the TSA has been useful in suppressing an underlying much greater rate of attempts.

Another piece of evidence which indirectly suggests that the rate of people wanting to do such things in airports has not increased significantly is the fact that in the US there has not been a rash of bombings on the TSA security lines. Clearly the TSA can not have screened the people in line to go through their screening (infinite regress). Those lines are often very long and placing people in a very vulnerable position in terms of either a firearms attack or explosives. (The security screening bullpen at DEN with the unsecured overlying galleries truly frightens me in this regard.) Yet none have been attempted so far. This suggests to me that there are other factors at work which make attacking airports and airlines less attractive.

I agree we need to find better solutions. I think that will come from privatizing airline security and return finding the appropriate balance between security and convenience to one that is made by the airlines, their insurers, and their customers, not some bureaucrat in Washington DC. It is not a trivial thing to figure out the best balance and may not be the same for all airlines, airports, etc.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

Im glad to see you agree. I’m certain we’d have a major issue without passenger screening.

And I've asked this before actually, but have not received a response. What evidence would persuade you that the TSA is not effective in terms of improving safety? Evidence that is in principle producible.

If there is none, then that is essentially a non-falsifiable belief. Maybe that is just your heartfelt sincere belief I suppose. And then it is just likely best to acknowledge that and agree to disagree.

If there is such evidence in principle, then one can of course discuss how close the available evidence is to one side or another. But otherwise it is not really a subject which can be rationally discussed, right?

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

I’m not sure what statistical evidence you’re referring to, but I’m curious as to your reasoning behind that.

How does the lack of a major attack prove that the TSA hasn’t been beneficial to the flying public? I could argue the fact that because the TSA is doing such a great job, an onboard attack hasn’t happened. What makes you certain that without the implementation of the TSA post 9/11 that the statistics would still read the same?

OK, fair question. I will try to explain my reasoning further here, though some of this will be drawn from post above, so please forgive any repetition. In brief, I would not claim to be certain of that (again, please don't engage in a straw man), but I would say there is no evidence that the TSA screenings have prevented attacks.

One can compute the rates of events involving non-crew members using an airplane as a weapon before and after the inception of the TSA in November 2001. There are a very small number, so this feasible. One possible outcome of doing this would be that the rates were statistically significantly greater before Nov 2001 than after. That is not the case, there is no statistically significant difference.

It is often asserted by the TSA, their employees, and defenders of their screening that the fact that there have been no such attacks since Nov 2001 proves that the TSA screening is effective. I point out the statistics of this NOT to prove that it means the screenings are ineffective, but rather to show that it does NOT prove that they are.

Since in general the burden of proof in an argument is on the party who asserts the existence of something (otherwise all sorts of crazy things can argued to be true, such as the existence of incorporeal dragons in my garage), the burden of proof is on those who assert that the TSA screenings are cost effective and improve safety.

I would assert there is a fair amount of evidence to suggest they are not effective. Amongst these are: the detailed analysis of the fact that the money spent on them could be spent 100X more effectively on saving lives, that TSA screenings probably indirectly increase traffic deaths, that the TSA are grossly ineffective at catching contraband (4%), that there have been no bomb attacks on the lines to enter TSA security screening, that it is easy to construct actual weapons from items purchased beyond their screening system, and that they have been unable to produce any evidence of attacks which they have mitigated which would not have been mitigated otherwise.

In balance then, I think the sum of the evidence suggests that the TSA screenings are not effective at improving public safety.

Does that answer your question?

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

You have to admit, that’s a pretty silly argument.

To paraphrase :

“There hasn’t been any major attacks since the inception of TSA, so that implies their organization isn’t very effective.”

Say what?!

Hahahaha!

That isn't what I said now is it? Please stop engaging in the straw man fallacy.

Perhaps it would be better to think of what evidence would convince you that the TSA screenings are not effective. Is there any in principle?

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

The FAA and TSA admit that their own self testing of trying (succeeding) to introduce decoys shows the screeners find less than 25% of the simulated threat devices. If we were serious about security we would follow the Israeli protocol. Also, we would have at least one air marshal on per every 70 seats.

I believe the rate of catching contraband in those tests was actually only 4%. It may be that the sort of draconian measures which would be necessary to further suppress these types of extremely rare threats are not really compatible with a relative free society.

 

[PeterNSteinmetz]

I think that an important question is, "How many attacks has the TSA deterred, if any?" I don't think we have any way of finding that out, which leads me to the conclusion that both of the following propositions are unproven:

1. The TSA deters attacks.

2. The TSA doesn't deter attacks.

That's a good question. They have not been able to produce any evidence of attacks mitigated which would not otherwise have been mitigated, even to classified Senate committees. There have been no bomb attacks on their screening lines in the US, which are pretty obvious targets. There are gaping holes in their protocols such as the ability to make and construct weapons using materials purchased past their checkpoints. Their ability to catch contraband is pathetic.

Does all of that add up to it is unproven? I'm not sure I can agree. Not proven to a high degree of certainty, I would agree. But I think the preponderance of evidence is that they are not effective in improving public safety.

Since their screening protocols involve a lot of money, possible leading to additional highway deaths, and massive invasion of privacy, I would argue that the balance of evidence does not favor the continuation of TSA screenings.